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The Social Embeddedness of Transactions:
Evidence from the Residential Real Estate Industry

Abstract
Information and communications technologies (ICT) are becoming pervasive in the residential real estate
industry and affecting the work lives of real estate agents. Drawing on data from a regional study of the residential
real-estate industry in the United States, we focus on the disintermediation or, more accurately, the re-intermediation
of real estate agents in the sales process. We examine how real estate agents are (1) taking advantage of new ICT in
their work, and (2) protecting themselves from others wishing to displace their position in the real estate value chain.
Our analysis draws on two contrasting theoretical approaches to better explain the roles of agents. That is, real
estate transactions are conceptualized as economic activities (buy/sell transactions) set within social structures that
agents help to develop. Firstly, transaction-cost economics is used to explain the nature of a real estate transaction.
From this analysis we develop a set of generic market coordination structures to profile the role of the agent in the
real estate transaction process. Secondly, the concept of social capital is used to structure an analysis of ICT-induced
changes to the process. Social capital is conceptualized as the set of social resources that an agent possesses that are
embedded in relationships. This analysis indicates that real estate agents are using social capital and relational forms
of coordination in order to protect and affirm their places within the real estate value chain. These social
relationships provide structures that define both the behavior of the agent, buyer, and seller (and other contributors)
and the various transactions that make up the sale of a residential property. We conclude by drawing implications for
research on disintermediation and for the practices of market intermediaries.
Keywords: transaction cost economics, coordination theory, social capital, disintermediation, re-intermediation,
field study, real estate
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The Social Embeddedness of Transactions: Evidence from the
Residential Real Estate Industry

Introduction
Numerous pundits, scholars and professional research firms are predicting that the increasing use of
electronic commerce is or will be reshaping virtually all industries. One phenomenon that has attracted particular
attention is disintermediation: the potential that buyers and sellers will find each other directly, rather than through
intermediaries. Indeed, some sources go as far as to predict that the widespread adoption of electronic commerce
will lead to the disappearance of all human “agents” who “merely” serve to help buyers find sellers (Bakos, 1998;
Doherty, 2000; Hess & Kemerer, 1994; Schmitz, 2000). There is, however, a growing realization that the actual
situation is more complex and effects will vary from industry to industry (Grover & Ramanlal, 1999; Schmitz,
2000). We use the context of the United States residential real estate industry to help us explore the phenomenon of
disintermediation, using two contrasting theoretical perspectives to develop a richer picture of this phenomenon.
Predictions of disintermediation seem to be borne out in certain industries (Hess & Kemerer, 1994). For
example, conventional travel agencies are struggling to survive the double blow of airline commission cuts and online competition (Lewis, Semeijn, & Talalayevsky, 1998; Lewis & Talalayevsky, 1997). The number of people
booking travel on-line is increasing rapidly. According to the Travel Industry Association, between 1997 and 1999
the number of U.S. customers booking travel on-line increased by 62.1 percent. By 2003 on-line travel sales,
according to Jupiter, are projected to quadruple to $16.6 billion ("Travel agents threatened", 1999). Dozens of
travel-oriented sites, such as Expedia, Preview and Travelocity, have sprung up since 1995. As well, airlines
increasingly sell tickets directly on their Websites or through wholly owned outlets, such as Orbitz. However, as
airlines take advantage of direct distribution channels such as the Internet, they have drastically decreased the
compensation provided to travel agents. Perhaps as a result, between 1997 and 1999, the total number of travel
agencies in the USA dropped 8.2 percent (Battey, 2000), even though people are traveling more than ever before
("Travel agents threatened", 1999).
Disintermediation seems to be an emerging possibility in the insurance industry as well. Insurance firms are
presently struggling with the role of agents as intermediaries in the insurance sales process. Insurance sales practices
have traditionally relied on agents to connect buyers with products, but this situation is beginning to change as
insurance companies look to ICT to reach buyers directly. Some major national insurance firms are presently luring
customers via the Internet (Fisher, 2000). For example, Allstate Insurance announced plans to sell insurance directly
by phone and Internet while laying-off 4,000 employees ("Allstate to layoff", 1999; Lohse, 1999).
We examine the potential for disintermediation in the U. S. residential real estate industry. Real estate
agents are intermediaries like travel agents and insurance agents, but real estate is a much more expensive and
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complex good than a plane ticket or insurance policy. We contrast two perspectives on disintermediation, a
transaction-cost perspective (e.g., Wigand, 1997; Williamson, 1981) and a social-capital perspective (e.g., Baker,
1984; Burt, 2000; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). The first perspective focuses on the cost of individual transactions under
different governance mechanisms, the second on how transactions are embedded in and affected by their social
context and by the network of relations that make up this context.
Transaction-cost economics was chosen for our analysis because many contemporary analyses of electronic
commerce have focused on the costs of carrying out transactions under different circumstances, specifically with
and without electronic support (Choudhury, Hartzel, & Konsynski, 1998; Grover & Ramanlal, 1999; Hess &
Kemerer, 1994). This work generally draws on the transaction-cost framework proposed by Williamson (1981), but
considers characteristics of the transaction beyond the nature of the good, and coordination structures other than the
choice between markets and hierarchies. We will use the generic market coordination structures described by
Malone and Smith (1988) to profile the role of the agent in the real estate transaction process.
Our second perspective views transactions as embedded in and affected by a network of social relationships
(Granovetter, 1973; 1985; Hansen, 1999; Krackhardt, 1990; Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). Sawyer et al. (1999) and
Crowston and Wigand (1999) have conceptualized real estate as an economic activity (a buy/sell transaction) set
within social structures which agents help to develop. These social structures can be seen in the networks of
relationships among agents, buyers, sellers, other real estate professionals, and others. These networks help to define
the behavior of the agent, buyer, and seller (and other contributors) and it is via these links that the various
transactions that make up the sale of a residential property occur. We draw on the notion of social capital, that is, the
set of resources embedded in relationships (Burt, 2000; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). A social-capital perspective treats
real estate as a process of using one’s relationships with others to draw on their information to complete a purchase.
This process requires a series of negotiations that arise out of, and are structured by, interpersonal ties among
participants in social networks.
The rest of this paper continues in four sections. In the first section we briefly review literature on the two
contrasting perspectives introduced above and consider how they might be applied to the real estate industry. We
follow this discussion by introducing our research setting, methodology and data sources. In the third section, we
present the findings from our fieldwork, both descriptive and interpretive. We conclude by comparing the
implications of the two perspectives for further research on electronic commerce driven disintermediation and for
the practice of market intermediaries.

Theoretical Perspectives on ICT uses in Residential Real Estate
In this section we present two contrasting perspectives on ICT use. The first perspective focuses on the cost
and economics of transactions, the second on how transactions are embedded in and affected by their social context.
A primary difference between these two perspectives is the way they conceptualize information. The transaction-
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cost perspective presents information as discreet and relocatable while the social-capital perspective sees
information as intimately embedded into the people in a social network.
A second difference between the two perspectives is in the view they represent the social context. By social
context we mean the larger milieu in which the phenomena of interest occurs. This context has temporal, physical,
and behavioral elements that shape action. The transaction-cost perspective de-emphasizes the social context, thus
we label this a socially thin perspective. Conversely, we label the social-capital perspective as socially rich. The
transaction-cost or socially thin framework lends itself to a functional perspective for comparison purposes, whereas
the social capital or socially rich framework lends itself to an interpretive perspective for comparison purposes. In
making this comparison, we explicitly recognize that both perspectives offer unique and valuable perspectives for
studying an industry’s core processes. Using both approaches provides a more conceptually complete and balanced
picture of the role of transactions, their relation to social context, and the set of actions needed to close a house.

Transaction-cost—A socially thin perspective
The basic concepts underlying transaction-cost economics were developed by Coase (1937) and further
refined by Williamson (1981). The fundamental unit of analysis in transaction-cost theory is a transaction, defined
as the transfer of property rights. Research in this perspective typically considers which governance
mechanism—market or hierarchy—is the least costly way to carry out a transaction, given the characteristics of the
goods and participants. Market governance means that a search is made for the lowest-cost supplier each time a
particular good is acquired. For example, a company needing some commodity parts might request bids from
potential suppliers whenever a supply is needed. Hierarchical governance means that the goods are made within the
company, allowing for hierarchical (i.e., managerial) control of their manufacture. For example, a company might
own the equipment and employ the workers needed to manufacture subcomponents of its product.
Transaction costs include all resources that have to be sacrificed in order to arrive at a mutually acceptable
agreement of the exchange of goods and services between two or more parties (Wigand, Picot, & Reichwald, 1997,
p. 269). One may identify four different types of costs (Wigand et al., 1997):
•

Contact costs (such as searching for information);

•

Contracting costs (such as negotiating and formulating a contract);

•

Monitoring costs (such as checking quality, quantity, prices, deadlines, maintaining secrecy); and

•

Adaptation costs (such as changes during the validity of the agreement).

These transaction costs are assumed to be lower for hierarchical governance, since it is not necessary to search for a
supplier or negotiate a new contract, and there is no possibility of “hold up” in case changes are needed to the
contract. Set against these transaction costs is the cost of the asset itself. It is assumed that the cost of the asset will
be least when it is acquired in the market, e.g., because of the possibility of acquiring the good from the lowest cost
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supplier, the possibility for the supplier to take advantages of economies of scale, and so forth. The choice of
governance mechanism depends on the balance between these costs.
To determine the balance for a particular transaction, it is necessary to take into account the particulars of
the transaction. According to the transaction-cost approach, transactions may be differentiated in several ways. Such
transaction attributes may include (see, e. g., Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Wigand et al., 1997) the:
1.

specificity of the asset involved in the transaction (defined as the difference between the best and
second-best use of the asset);

2.

frequency with which similar transactions occur;

3.

duration or period of time over which transactions are repeated;

4.

complexity of the transaction;

5.

uncertainty of the transaction (e.g., uncertainty about what performance will be required);

6.

difficulty of measuring performance in the transaction;

7.

connectedness of the transaction to other transactions involving other people; and

8.

information impactedness (defined as asymmetric information distribution with the potential of
opportunistic exploitation).

In general, the higher a transaction scores along these dimensions, the higher the transaction cost is likely to be. As a
result, transactions high on these measures are good candidates for hierarchical governance, while transactions low
on these measures are candidates for market governance. For example, coal, water and energy have very low asset
specificity, low transaction complexity, low uncertainty, easy measurement of performance and low information
impactedness. Correspondingly, these commodity goods are typically acquired in the market. On the other hand, for
General Motors, car bodies had high asset specificity, high frequency and high complexity and so General Motors
bought its supplier, Fisher Body, in order to use hierarchical governance for this transaction (Chandler, 1962).

Social capital —A socially rich perspective
The second perspective we present also considers transactions, but rather than treating them as the unit of
analysis, focuses on the way transactions are embedded in social networks which give rise to social capital. By
social network we mean collected set of social relationships (also known as ties) among people (Burt, 2000). This
changes the unit of analysis to the relations in the social network (and its use). Because of this explicit attention to
how transactions are embedded into social networks and the contexts in which these networks form, we label this
view “socially rich.” In this view transactions cannot be considered in isolation; rather, they must be seen as
occurring within existing networks of relationships, embedded within social structures and involving information
from many sources who are part of the social fabric in which the transactions and processes occur (Burt, 1988).
Social capital is an outgrowth of concepts of human capital that has roots in both sociology and economics.
For example, Swedberg (1994) and Powell and Smith-Doerr, (1994), among others, have argued for the re-
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integration of these two conceptual perspectives as they arose in response to our need to understand how people
interact. According to Putnam (1993), the first use of the term social capital was by Jacobs (1961, p. 138). Today,
the concept of human capital is widely used and understood by both sociologists and economists. In this context, the
concept of “capital” is reflected less in land, factories, tools and machines than, more and more, in the knowledge
and skills of human beings (Becker, 1975). Coleman (1988) reasoned that in addition to knowledge and skills, a
distinct portion of human capital has to do with individuals' ability to associate with each other, a facet critical not
only to economic aspects of life, but to virtually every other realm of social existence as well. This view implies
that social capital is one measure of the ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and
organizations (1972; Coleman, 1988; see also Putnam, 1993; 1995). Seen this way, all economic transactions are
socially embedded (Baker, 1984; Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Hansen, 1999). Social structures thus encompass the set
of patterns, relations and artifacts that both shape and evolve through the interaction among people. While these
social structures are difficult to define, and constantly evolving since they incorporate physical, temporal and
intangible elements, they are also fundamental to how people interact (White, 1981).
This ability to associate—to develop structural relations—varies greatly from culture to culture, but it is
determined by the degree to which communities share norms and values and are able to subordinate individual
interests to those of larger groups (Burt, 1982). An outgrowth of such shared value is trust, an essential ingredient in
any form of social capital, which, in turn, has a lasting, large and measurable value. Trust between members of a
community permits a wide variety of social and business relationships to evolve. Contrarily, individuals who do not
trust each other tend to cooperate only in settings with formal rules and regulations. These rules and regulations have
to be agreed upon, negotiated, litigated and often enforced. The resulting legal apparatus that must to be put in place
as a substitute of trust is a major component of the “transaction costs” identified by the economist (Swedberg, 1994).
The social structures of interest to us for this work are those sets of relationships that help to define the way
homes are sold in the US residential real estate industry. In particular, we focus on the agent’s use of social networks
to help them develop and use their social capital relative to the set of processes that comprise a real estate
transaction. The premise here is that social structures both give rise to and represent social capital (Tsai & Ghoshal,
1998). For this work, social capital means the set of social resources embedded in relationships (Tsai & Ghoshal,
1998, p. 464). Social capital and the underlying network of social relations thus provide a useful conceptual
perspective for understanding the contribution of agents to the real estate process.
Social capital can be described by three dimensions of the social connections among people: structure,
relation, and cognitive (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; Wellman, 1988, pp. 31-40). The structural dimension involves social
interaction that the agent uses to gain access, information, or resources. The relational dimension encompasses
qualities that arise from interactions (such as trust and loyalty). The cognitive dimension includes attributes such as
shared norms, codes of action, and convergence or similarity of views. Social capital is important for people who
have more work autonomy—which is why most studies of social capital focus on managers and knowledge workers
(Burt, 1997).
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Summary: ICT Use and Disintermediation
In this section we presented two perspectives on ICT use and the potential for disintermediation in the
context of residential real estate. The first perspective focused on the cost of individual transactions and the second
on how transactions are embedded into the social context. The key differences between the transaction perspective
and social perspective are summarized in Table 1. The transaction-cost perspective suggests that a transaction such
as a real estate closing can be isolated and examined independent of its context. The role of information is external
to those that use it and intermediaries are thus replaceable if other information conveyances can be found. The
agent’s role is contractual and the social structures are both relatively unimportant. The role of ICT is thus as a
decoupler: it serves as a new means of conveyance.
The social-capital perspective suggests that the real estate closing is embedded in a set of social relations
that arise from complex ties among a range of stakeholders. Information needed to complete the closing is intrinsic
to the stakeholders themselves, is shared across these social networks, and is held internally within those networks. .
In such a view, the agent’s role is defined by relationships. The social structures that shape this definition are the
primary means by which agents help to enact the buy and sell activities that a house closing needs. Finally, ICT can
serve as a magnifier of social capital and its use may help differentiate successful and unsuccessful real estate
agents.

Data and methods
Our approach to understanding information-intensive industries demands insight into both the costs of
transactions and the social networks in which the transactions take place. We start by describing the industry setting
for our study. We focused our data collection on a particular regional setting, drawing our data from one
metropolitan area in the northeast United States. By doing this, we can gather data that informs both theoretical
perspectives, and minimize the distortions due to the variations in local customs and laws that a multi-region study
might face. In the rest of this section, we outline our data collection methods and data analysis approaches. Given
the exploratory nature of this work coupled with our desire to build a rich picture of how real estate agents practice
their craft, we pursued this work through intensive research method of fieldwork (Jackson, 1987).

Research Setting The United States Residential Real Estate Industry
Our study was carried out in the U.S. residential real estate industry. The real estate industry is a most
appropriate setting for our study because it is:
•

information-intensive and information-driven;

•

an intermediated market (agents and brokers connect buyers and sellers);

•

based on agent-buyer-seller relationships;

•

transaction-based, with high value and asset specificity; and
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•

currently experiencing ICT-induced changes, including predictions of disintermediation.
Certainly, residential real estate is an information-intensive business. The industry highlights the role of

information and underlying computing and communications technologies (Baen & Guttery, 1997; Tucillo, 1997).
Agents connect buyers to sellers and do so through control and dissemination of information provided through the
Multiple Listing Service (MLS). Agents are valued for the information skills they can bring to bear on marketing
and finding properties and on consummating sales. However, since agents and real-estate firms are pure marketintermediaries, their positions are threatened by new ways for buyers and sellers to find one another.
Indeed, the traditional work processes of real estate agents have been and continue to be influenced and
shaped by the use of ICT. Agents have rapidly embraced new ICT that might give them an advantage, such as
computer databases, geographical information systems, pagers, cellular phones, and most recently, e-mail and the
World Wide Web (Crowston & Wigand, 1999). Both our data and other contemporary literature (e.g., Buxmann &
Gebauer, 1998; Crowston & Wigand, 1999) suggest that knowledgeable agents are concerned about their future
roles in the face of the potential changes to real estate propelled by ICT use. Of course, as we highlight above,
concerns about the impacts of ICT are not unique to the real estate industry. Other industries, e.g., automobile sales,
travel agencies and financial services, can be observed undergoing similar ICT-influenced changes.

Data Collection Methods
The goal of our research is to better understand how residential real estate agents work and how their work
is being affected by ICT use. To support this, our research approach focused on documenting and understanding
how the agents use various ICT in their work. We used the standard data collection methods of fieldwork:
interviewing (both semi-structured and structured), participant observation, and archival records collection (Jackson,
1987). Field notes were prepared after every field encounter. These notes have two parts: a chronology of action and
an interpretation of these actions. The chronology represents a factual recounting of the observation period from the
observer’s perspective. The interpretive notes provide a more free-flowing account of the intuitions, ideas, and
interactions that arose during, and because of, the observation.
As we outlined above, we focused on one local market that encompasses a medium-sized city and its
suburbs. This focus allows for more convenient data collection. A series of 13 interviews and several observations,
detailed below, totaling twenty days of fieldwork, were conducted from September 1998 through December 1998
(see Table 2). We also collected all memos, correspondence, and other printed or written material that we could.
Often, these “organizational droppings” provided insight into observed behaviors, allowed for historical accuracy
and progression, and set out future issues. Current archival data collection includes items provided to us by the
agents/interviewees, material sent along by the local board of realtors, and extensive library research by two
graduate students.
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We used fieldwork to gather data from the range of participants involved in a real estate closing process.
This includes interviews of real estate agents, real estate brokers, a real estate franchise owner, a broker/owner, the
local realty association president, the president of the local MLS, and several people involved in a typical closing
(see Table 2). Our interviewees included four women and nine men, and we spoke with several key informants on
multiple occasions (Seidler, 1974). Interviewees include experienced and relatively new agents, technically
sophisticated and technically naive agents, broker/owners and franchise managers. After each interview, we asked
our informants to recommend others to talk to (snowball sampling). We continued to interview agents until we
reached theoretic saturation on the key constructs of transaction costs and social capital (Miles and Huberman,
1994). We also spoke with a number of the participants in the real estate closing process such as inspectors and
appraisers to check the real estate agent’s responses (and found that these people’s responses corroborated the real
estate agent’s perspectives).
In addition to the interviews we observed five meetings of the local board of realtors committee on new
ICT. In each meeting, the role and importance of such ICT as Internet-based applications and conducting real estate
business via the Web were addressed directly or indirectly. We followed up by meeting individually with committee
members who represented both points of view on these various ICT issues. We gathered archival documents from
all interviewees, materials from the meetings, additional material from a range of sources such as the local and
national associations for realtors, web sites and the existing professional and academic literature.
Insert Table 2 about here

Data Analysis
Analysis draws on field notes, transcriptions from the interviews and observations, and archival records and
material collected during the fieldwork. Two analysis techniques are used to analyze this corpus: interim
documentation and explanatory event matrices (Miles, 1979; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Interim documentation
arises from the reflective, ongoing analysis of field notes. This analysis was done individually by each researcher as
well as by all researchers as a group. This technique enabled the synthesis of data to support and refute interim
propositions. This interim analysis will also help to guide future data collection efforts. Explanatory event matrices
relate constructs to events, organizing a rich set of data to respond to propositions (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Data
are used to populate the cells, with the other axis being sources of data. This technique demands an a priori
theoretical (or at least categorical) set of constructs to serve as one axis of the matrix. And, as we have discussed,
this analysis is driven by the elements of the real estate closing transaction and by the social capital constructs in
which this real estate transaction is embedded.
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Results
In this section, we present the results of our fieldwork. We will first describe the industry as we have come
to understand it, then discuss the increased use of ICT in this industry and conclude the presenting some apparent
changes in the role of agents.

Overview of the residential real estate industry
We will first briefly review the structure of the real estate industry in the United States, then outline the
stages in a residential real estate transaction. What follows is a generic description that touches upon the common
aspects of the set of steps that result in a sale of a house (the “closing”). Law and the regulations of professional
societies govern real estate work, so the process we describe is specific to the United States and is further
differentiated by state and local laws, regional and local customs and legal precedent.
The role of real estate agents is to bring together the seller and buyer of a property and to advise both of
these principals, independently, regarding their responsibilities in the transaction. In the U.S. there are typically two
agents involved in a transaction. The listing agent (or seller’s agent) assists a seller in marketing a property, by
helping to determine an asking price, guiding the seller to make the property attractive, advertising it and screening
potential buyers. When offers to buy the property are received, the seller’s agent advises in the negotiations and
details of the transaction.
The second agent helps a buyer find suitable properties among those offered for sale and narrow the
selection to a specific property. Usually the buyer physically inspects several potential properties before deciding
which to buy; the second agent makes the arrangements for these visits and accompanies the buyer. Once a property
is selected, the second agent provides advice on making an offer to purchase the property and helps in the
negotiations and details of the transaction. When an offer is made and accepted there are typically a set of
contingencies on the contract that need to be addressed. These contingencies typically include the buyer’s financing,
inspection and appraisal of the property, and so forth. An agent typically helps by providing access to resources to
address these issues. For example, an agent might refer a buyer to a lender, house inspector or other necessary
professionals.
Most agents share listings through a multiple listing service (MLS). After a listing agent signs a contract
with the seller of a property, the agent enters a description of the property in the MLS database. Originally, the MLS
was a printed book combining listings from all member agencies. Today, MLS systems are computerized databases.
The MLS for a particular region is usually owned by the local realtors’ organization (board) but typically operated
by a specialized MLS company. Most of these MLS databases are based on proprietary technology and are
developed to handle specific regional issues. Currently this degree of customization makes it difficult for an MLS
database system to easily interoperate with others.
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Agents who are members of the MLS can search the database for properties that meet their clients’ needs,
and can more easily show properties. The door key to many MLS-listed properties is made available to other
members of the MLS, e.g., in a “MLS lock box” to which all members have access, attached to the front door handle
of the property. The lock box can record all accesses to the key, providing the selling agent a record of which other
agents have viewed the property. In other words, the MLS is much more than just an information repository, since it
includes services and agreements that shape the relationship between agents.
In most cases the seller pays both agents. When listing a property, the seller contracts to pay the seller’s
agent a commission, usually a percentage of the sales price, when the transaction closes. These commissions are
typically in the range of five to seven percent of the value of the property. Thus, while exact figures are not kept,
using six percent as a base commission, in 1998 total commissions exceeded $38 Billion (and in 1999 grew to be
greater than $41 Billion) (current exact sale price and sales volume data are available on-line from the National
Association of Realtors at http://nar.realtor.com/research/home.htm). In residential real estate, the seller agrees to
pay the commission even if the seller’s agent does not find the eventual buyer. As a result, an agent can simply
accept a listing and wait for a buyer to emerge. This somewhat lopsided relationship in favor of the agent may have
consequences for trust perceptions and may create potential conflicts of interest in the agent’s relationships with
buyers and sellers. However, a seller’s agent is considered to owe a fiduciary duty to the seller, which includes the
responsibility to provide a reasonable level of effort.
A buyer need not have any contractual agreement with an agent. When a buyer buys a property listed in the
MLS, the MLS agreement among agents provides that that an agent who introduces the buyer be paid half of the
seller’s agent’s commission. Again, the MLS goes far beyond a simple information conduit to include these
agreements. Because the seller pays both agents, traditionally both agents owe a fiduciary duty only to the seller,
creating a difference of interest between the buyer and an agent with whom they may be working. For example, an
agent must disclose to the seller the maximum they think the buyer would be willing to pay for the property, even
though this is clearly not in the best interests of the buyer. However, a buyer can independently contract with an
agent for what is called buyer’s agency. In this case, if a buyer purchases a property offered directly by a seller (a
for-sale-by-owner or FSBO), the buyer must pay the agent’s commission. If the buyer buys an MLS property, then
the seller pays the commission as usual. In return for the guaranteed commission, the buyer’s agent owes a fiduciary
duty to the buyer rather than the seller.
In all states in the United States, only a person with a broker’s license can convey real property, so agents
are affiliated with a real estate firm that employs, or is headed by, a broker. Real estate firms range in size from a
single agent-broker to dozens of agents along with clerical and managerial staff. Some agencies are franchises of
national chains (e.g., Better Homes and Gardens or RE/Max); others are local. Agents enter into listing contracts on
behalf of the broker, get a variety of services from the firm and, in return, give the firm a share of their commissions.
These relationships are contractual, as agents are independent contractors rather than employees of the agency. A
highly productive agent has the bargaining power to negotiate for additional services or a more favorable division of
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the commission. In other words, the organizational structure of the real estate industry is primarily contractual,
agents essentially acting as “companies of one.” Independent agent-brokers provide their own resources and develop
their own network. Independent real estate agents do not have to share their commissions with an agency, but do not
have access to the resources of the agency as an affiliated agent does.

Increased use of ICT in the real estate industry
The increased use of ICT in residential real estate encompasses both information and communication
technologies. The primary increase in information technology seems to be the use of the web to display house
listings. A second increase is the use of advanced search features and interfaces to access the online MLS. Our
research to date suggests that the ways in which real estate agents access the MLS and use the advanced searching,
querying and reporting features that the current forms of MLS access software allows is worth additional attention.
The increased use of communication technologies is seen in the nearly pervasive use of cellular phones and in the
growing interconnection of traditional phone service, voice mail, cellular phones, pagers, and even email as an
integrated telecommunication system that delivers all forms of communication to the agent as she drives around
town.
Of course the increased use of ICT also increased support needed for maintenance, data entry and record
keeping. Many agents look to the local real estate franchise or broker/owner who holds their real estate license for
such support. This has the potential to change the dynamic between the agency and the individual agent, moving the
local real estate agency into a larger role of providing critical (and expensive) ICT infrastructure for agents. And,
increasingly, these local real estate agencies are franchises of national-level organizations such as Prudential, Better
Homes and Gardens and RE/Max.
Benjamin and Wigand (1995), Sarkar, Butler and Steinfield (1995), Bakos (1998), Wigand (1997) and
Gellman (1996) have all hypothesized that the advent of networked ICT such as the Internet might enable electronic
markets, perhaps resulting in decreased coordination costs and changes in the value chain. One potential advantage
of electronic markets is possibility of designing value chains that require less physical intermediation between
producers and consumers (e.g., Choudhury et al., 1998). Given that residential agents act as pure marketintermediaries (connecting buyers and sellers but rarely buying and selling themselves), their positions are
potentially threatened when ICT provide new ways for buyers and sellers to find one another (Neches, Neches,
Postel, Tenenbaum, & Frank, n.d.). The growth of real estate commerce on the Internet has attracted special interest
(see, e.g., Crowston & Wigand, 1999).
Of particular relevance for this research are the numerous Web sites (more than 3,600 National Association
of Realtors, 1998) being developed to support various aspects of the real estate sales process. Numerous MLS
systems, as well as advertisements for houses sold directly by owners without a real estate agent (for-sale-by-owner,
or FSBO), can be found on the Web. For example, Homehunter (www.homehunter.com) links to real estate
classified advertisements in thirty-one daily Knight-Ridder newspapers. Abele’s Owner’s Network
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(www.owners.com) lists about 35,000 houses for sale by owner, with expectations for this to double within the year.
Such services are directed to consumers trying to make an end-run around the MLS cartel. Rather than paying a
commission, sellers pay only for advertising. A listing in Owners.com without pictures is free; packages including
on-line pictures and physical yard signs cost $65 to $115.
Some non-traditional players are beginning to enter this industry. For example, Microsoft’s Homeadvisor
(homeadvisor.msn.com) features a database of more than 500,000 homes drawn from regional MLS systems. The
site offers specific geographic mapping, including such statistics as the neighborhoods’ median age and income,
ratings of local schools, and frequency of crime. Other services, such as HomeScout Real Estate Search
(www.homescout.com), integrate information from multiple sources. Such Web-based services suggest that there is
some evolution towards the uses of electronic markets to support buyers finding sellers by searching a database of
offerings (Crowston, 1996). Combining access to both the MLS system and FSBO homes, as HomeScout does,
means that buyers may not even be aware of the status of a house they are considering.
Many professionals are involved in the final details required before closing a real estate transaction. Agents
increasingly facilitate transactions by coordinating a web of other service providers for their clients, such as building
inspectors, appraisers, loan officers and lawyers. Agents add value for their clients by quickly assembling the
necessary professionals, thus providing one-stop shopping.
Many of these supporting services are increasingly available via the Web. Fletcher (1997) points to several
sites that offer appraisals. For example, Experian Information Solution (www.experian.com) sells reports of the
assessed value of a property and the prices of comparable houses. Yahoo (realestate.yahoo.com) offers reports of
home sales for free. Overby (1997) reviews a selection of mortgage sites. Mortgage origination on the Internet has
reached one percent of total originations in the United States, according to California-based Myers Internet services
(www.myer.com). Warren Myer, company CEO, said that the company expects this figure to increase to 2.5 percent
in 1998, 5 percent in 1999 and to reach 12 percent by the year 2001 (Myer, 1997). Many real estate Web sites
provide links to these services. For example, Homeadvisor.com includes an integrated mortgage finance component,
which permits users to evaluate lenders’ offerings and, while on-line at the Web site, to actually qualify for a loan.
Finet Holdings has gone beyond linking its financial services to the emerging real estate sites. This company built its
own network to automate the entire real estate transaction process. Its subsidiary, the Property Transaction Network
(PTN) (www.theptn.com) attempts to bring real estate agents and consumers together with real estate services and
insurance providers, while its finance site, www.iqualify.com, provides instant loan approval.
Many real estate agents have begun to realize the potential disruption of the Web (Bottenberg, n.d.; Harper,
1997; Self, 1997). Some are adopting these new communications channels for their own use. For example, one agent
in the vicinity of San Francisco, Carol Lucas, launched her own Web site in December 1996 and states that 75
percent of her business is a result of her Web presence (Nelson, 1998). Our work suggests that other agents are
stressing individual service and creating other value-adding mechanisms, such as buyer-broker relationships,
connections to other house-buying services, buy/sell deals, and guarantees.
14

Apparent changes in the role of real estate agents
Three major implications can be drawn concern the ways in which the traditional role of real estate agents
as information intermediaries is being contested. Until recently, the only way a potential buyer could easily identify
houses for sale was by working with an agent who could search the MLS database. The listing data were an
important resource and source of information-based power for the agent and, therefore, closely held. For example,
agents pointed out that as recently as the early 1990’s, it was common practice to allow no customer access to the
MLS (print or electronic), making the MLS and the agent a de facto information monopoly.
Recently, this control has been weakened by the development of alternative sources of listing information.
In particular, the Internet reduces the cost of some communications. Some individual realtors and for-sale-by-owner
listing sites are taking advantage of the new medium to more widely disseminate their listings. Such actions seem
inconsistent with the view of the listing information as something to be closely controlled. However, from the point
of view of a single agent trying to sell houses, listings are advertisements to be made available to as large an
audience as possible. Given these developments, many MLS operators and real estate agencies seem to have also
decided to use this new medium to make MLS data publicly available. After all, the only way for a listing to get into
the MLS is by contract with an agent, so widespread publication does not obviate the need for listing agents, who
ultimately control listing information. Thus, it is common to see MLS data about a single property in multiple
places. For example, such data could be listed on www.realtor.com, an agency’s corporate Web site, a collaborative
Web site (with the local newspaper) and/or on the individual (listing) agent’s personal Web site.
On the other hand, the data also show that real estate agents seem to play an increasing role in “process
support.” That is, as the contractual complexity of the real estate process increases, real estate agents are valued for
their ability to guide the buyer and seller through the transaction. The legal as well as financial implications
embedded within these changes in real estate processes are not always clear, and agents and brokerages are still
trying to define and specify these changes. This process support is important for most buyers/sellers since most buy
or sell homes infrequently. As a result of these developments, the traditional roles of the real estate agent are being
redefined. It appears that agents are increasingly a guide and hand-holder in this process. Moreover, these
developments highlight how the social structure, personal contacts and local knowledge increase the value added by
the agents. Figure 5 presents a model highlighting the structural dimension of agent social capital. In this figure, the
basic buy/sell transaction is shown embedded in a network of other relationships. In essence, the presence of the
agent and her ability to bring together the network of connections that a closing demands creates the market
(Swedberg, 1994).
The data provide some examples of the active management of both weak and strong ties and, thus, of social
capital. For example, in our interviews we learned that agents classify people as suspects, prospects, customers or
clients depending on the degree of their relationship, and then treat people in these categories in specific ways. A
buyer’s agent sounds out the client in several ways to determine their needs, drawing specific information based on
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the interpretive schema of the agent. The robustness and complexity of the agent’s interpretive scheme in conducting
this information gathering appears to be a major differentiator among agents (Lamb, 1997).
Moreover, agents also carefully construct a set of strong ties to such professionals as real estate lawyers,
mortgage brokers and house inspectors. Each agent maintains several of each of these professionals in a slowly
evolving and symbiotic social network. An agent may have three or four lawyers in her network and add a new tie
only if one of the existing links begins to weaken (by being too busy or not performing to the level expected). This
type of action reflects the cognitive and relational aspects of social capital (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998).

Discussion
In this section we first discuss the findings from each perspective. We then provide an integrated discussion
in which we highlight the contributions of both perspectives and the relationships among them.

A transaction-cost perspective
In our discussion of the transaction-cost perspective, we noted how particular transaction characteristics
suggest the use of particular governance mechanisms. Analyzed from this perspective, a real estate transaction
exhibits a mix of characteristics, leading to mixed recommendations. Houses differ widely along numerous
dimensions (size, location, features), which makes them hard to describe succinctly and increases their asset
specificity. Real-estate transactions are complex, with somewhat high uncertainty and difficulty in measuring
outcomes. Finally, transactions are characterized by high information impactedness, since sellers typically know
much more about their houses than buyers can easily find out. From the perspective of transaction-cost theory, these
characteristics of the real estate transaction would suggest that real estate will have very high transaction costs.
Indeed, the nearly $100M/year in commissions earned by real estate agents in our research area (based on sales data
and commission fees from this region) can be seen as transaction costs. A transaction-cost perspective thus leads to
the suggestion that transaction costs would be reduced if hierarchical rather than market governance mechanisms
could be used. On the other hand, the low frequency of the transaction requires that real estate be primarily a
market-based activity, since it would be impractical for an individual who rarely buys a house to own the ability to
make one.
While transaction-cost economics provides mixed suggestions for the governance mechanism to adopt, the
principles of this perspective can provide a basis for reducing the transaction cost. One view of the role of real estate
agents is that they help reduce the transaction cost for an individual buyer. For example, an agent can reduce contact
cost by use of the MLS, provide standardized contracts to minimize contracting cost, monitor performance, and so
on. Agents might also address some of the transaction attributes, e.g., by providing specialized knowledge to help
buyers more quickly determine if a house is appropriate (thus managing asset specificity), providing transaction
support (thus managing transaction complexity and information impactedness), and so on. Clearly, transaction costs
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cannot be entirely avoided, since agents must be paid, but the cost of the agent could be less than the transaction
costs borne by a buyer who does not use an agent (Schmitz, 2000).
Researchers have considered additional factors within this basic transaction-cost framework. In particular,
Malone and Smith (1988) analyzed the effects of the cost of communications and the reliability of those performing
the tasks. They describe four generic structures and rank them in terms of production costs, coordination costs, and
vulnerability costs. Of the four models, the centralized market model depicted in Figure 1 is closest to the typical
residential real estate process. The customers contact the real estate agent, who sets the process in play by
coordinating the interaction among other value added players in the real estate process. In this model, the real estate
agent is the intermediary between the customer and the seller in the process. Figure 2 offers a more realistic model,
showing the role of the MLS in centralizing the real estate process, as will be discussed below. The MLS allows
buyers and sellers in contact with only a single agent to still share information about available listings.
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here
We might ask, however, what keeps the consumer from circumnavigating the agent to access other value
added players directly? The results of accessing other players directly is described by the decentralized market
model of Malone and Smith (1988), shown in Figure 3 direct connection between buyers and sellers. The number of
required communications channels in the decentralized market is exponentially greater than in the centralized
market model, reflecting the increased cost and decreased efficiency of this approach, especially compared to Figure
2.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Malone and Smith’s analysis also addresses the effect of new forms of information and communication
technologies. Buyers in a decentralized market face a high cost for communications, but this cost can be reduced by
the use of technology. For example, the MLS makes it possible for an agent to have complete information about
houses offered without the cost of contacting each seller or agent personally. A similar transition is now unfolding
for individual buyers. Historically, buyers did not have direct access to the MLS information, because of the cost of
reproducing the paper copies and because restricting access protected the position of agents, de facto making the
MLS and its surrounding processes an information monopoly. However, because of the substantial reduction in
communications costs and because many agents share MLS information with buyers as a means of advertising their
expertise, many MLS systems or MLS-derived house descriptions are now available on the Internet (Crowston &
Wigand, 1999).
A transaction-cost perspective suggests that a new structure for the industry may be emerging as a result of
new ICT, as shown in Figure 4. In this structure, buyers and sellers can contact each other directly, as in the
decentralized market of Figure 3, but use the Web and the myriad real estate-related sites to avoid incurring the cost
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of maintaining individual communications ties. Because this new structure also avoids the cost of hiring agents, the
emergence of this structure leads to the common prediction of disintermediation.
Insert Figure 4 about here
In summary, the transaction-cost perspective focuses on changes in the costs of various transactions due to
factors such as changes in access to information. Analysis from this perspective leads to the prediction of
disintermediation as buyers and sellers seek to save the costs of the agent and the industry structure shifts from
Figure 2 to Figure 4. This shift would be reflected in a growing proportion of homes sold by owners (so-called
FSBOs, or “for sale by owner”). However, data from our study region suggest that the FSBO rate remains steady at
about 2% of the total number of transactions, while national figures presented by the National Association of
Realtors show that FSBO transactions have remained steady for the last six years. There may be some skepticism
given the source of the data. Another explanation for the apparent contradiction may be that the Internet is too new
of a phenomenon in our study region to have had a significant impact.
From a transaction-cost perspective, another expectation (and perhaps best seen as an intermediate
position) would be for agents to slowly “give ground.” That is, we would expect to see agents offer their services
piece-meal to consumers, that is, unbundling. For instance, an agent might focus on providing a select group of
services such as MLS listings and mortgage services. There is some evidence of this behavior in the region we
studied. For example, several agents are now offering limited support, such as a flat fee for entering data to the MLS
or a pay-as-you-go arrangement for services such as advertising.
We might also expect that as the use of the Internet is legitimated, agents will face increasing competition
from other groups that seek to use ICT to disseminate their own information. For example, mortgage firms, financial
institutions, chambers of commerce, and other value-added players have also established Web sites and crossaffiliations influencing the real estate business. An increasing number of Web publications list FSBO properties.
Through the use of the Internet and ICT, consumers are able to access information that formerly was only made
available to agents. On the other hand, both Schmitz (2000) and Grover and Ramanlal (1999) note that
intermediaries can also use ICT to manipulate the cost of a transaction. Specifically, intermediaries can increase
transaction costs by further constraining access or adding complexity to goods and services to complicate cost
comparisons. In other words, the flexibility of electronic markets works in both directions. Our current data reveal
no such manipulations, though most agents encourage their clients (buyer or seller) to communicate through them.
This allows the agents to intermediate any discussions or decisions relative to closing and provides the opportunity
for direct manipulation.

A social-capital perspective
A social-capital perspective leads to conceptualizing the process of selling/buying real estate as a set of
interactions set within social structures that the agents help to develop. These social structures define both how the
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agent, buyer, seller (and other contributors) behave and guide the various transactions that make up the sale of a
residential property. An agent builds a set of relations within (and because of) their social structures. These relations
and structures are shaped by norms and values—both of the agent and the people with whom the agent interacts. For
example, since most buyers need to secure a mortgage, real estate agents seek out mortgage brokers who will help
their clients. In this way the social network, and especially the strong ties, represents the embedded nature of
information relative to the closing process. That is, important information needed to move a house to close is
distributed across the members of the real estate agent’s social network. Thus, the ability to identify and draw on the
proper person’s expertise is one part of the real estate agent’s value-adding expertise. Moreover, the agent is central
to these links and their removal leads to structural holes (the missing connections between nodes that signal the
absence of access to needed information, see Burt, 2000).
Figure 5 presents a graphic depiction of the structural dimension of agent social capital. This figure can be
compared with the other models described above. In this view, it is the core networks the agents maintain and the
interconnections among them that function as the coordination mechanisms. One value of a social network is that
the well-connected members have more access to information than do poorly connected members. This shows up in
the ability of well-connected network members to bridge sparsely connected social units (known as structural holes,
see Burt, 1992). For example, real estate agents have large networks for buying/selling home compared to the
typical buyer or seller. These agents can bridge the structural hole that most sellers and buyers face, making them
invaluable to the transaction.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Theorizing from a social-capital perspective suggests that the increased use of ICT by real estate agents
provides a means for these people to extend their social networks and increase their social capital (Eisenberg et al.,
1985; Kraut, 1998). Increased connectivity (via cellular phones, pagers and email, often interconnected) allows a
real estate agent to more easily maintain contacts with the members of their social networks. For example, in the
regional market that serves as the basis for our research reported here, well-connected and successful agents
maintain contact lists (databases) that may have 10,000 or more contacts (the metropolitan statistical area is nearly
500,000 people). The increasing use of certain ICT (such as cellular phones, fax and email) also make it easier for
potential customers to contact the agent. And, as we mentioned earlier, an Internet presence can extend the agent’s
presence. Contemporary “web-savvy” agents often have their listings on personal Web sites, organizational Web
sites (such as local franchise sites), cooperative sites (such as www.homehunter.com), and the National Association
of Realtors’ Web site (www.realtor.com).
Our study suggests that conceptualizing social capital in terms of their underlying, network-like structures,
such as articulated by the strength of weak ties theory (Granovetter, 1973; 1982), provides insight into how real
estate agents work (Crowston, Sawyer, & Wigand, 2001). The strength of weak ties theory suggests that the social
network of any member is their primary resource for learning about the world. Participants in the network have
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relationships with one another of varying strengths. Strongly tied-together members in a network tend to be more
similar to each other than different, more likely to be available for each other, share more common interests, and
interact more frequently. Conversely, weakly tied-together members in a social network tend to communicate less
frequently, be more different than similar, and provide both more new information into the network and more access
to other social networks. Relative to the uses of ICT some evidence of the value of such ties can be seen in the online chat groups (known as “homespeak forums”) that are part of www.realtor.com.
Applied to the U.S. residential real estate domain, this suggests that agents with large social networks
populated with more weak ties will have more social capital to draw upon. The more resource-rich agents will get
more listings (via acquaintances) and will also be able to point prospective clients to others who might be able to
provide value-adding services. The latter practice may result in various forms of desirable reciprocation with these
others, thus widening the degree of the agent’s connectedness and exposure. Simply, social networks are selfreinforcing (Burt, 2000).

Comparing the perspectives
Our data to date suggests that for real estate, the common focus on closing as a single transaction presents a
useful but incomplete view of the nature of the industry and the potential effects of ICT. Like travel agents and
stockbrokers, real estate agents are market intermediaries in that they coordinate the series of pieces that make up
the transaction by connecting the buyer with the seller. However, real estate transactions are more complex and
require the contribution of many different value-adding players. As a result, real estate agents are less replaceable in
the process than stockbrokers or travel agents. This contradicts the potential for disintermediation suggested by
market economics (Sarkar et al., 1995; Schmitz, 2000). In other words, the real estate business is not a “perfect”
market in economic sense, it needs the support offered by real estate agents to run smoothly.
Gittell and Weiss (1997) note that considerable research has been conducted on the antecedents of
coordination and on the structure of organizational networks, while research linking formal organizational practices
and informal networks has been relatively neglected. The concepts of informal networks, social capital and
relational coordination appear to be key to the agents’ ability to safeguard their position as the market intermediary
and coordinator of the real estate transaction process. Thus it is important to look at network-related activities in the
real estate transaction process in order to understand how the agent coordinates and influences other value-adding
players in the value chain. The further development of formal theories of social capital could lead to strategic
application of these theoretical perspectives in the areas of electronic commerce.
Conceptualizing real estate agent’s work as the development of social capital allows us to also view the
process of a buy/sell as embedded in the social structures created by current contractual arrangements. For example,
the closing step typically demands physical presence and paper-based transactions. Thus, an agent who can provide
the seller (and/or buyer) with a competent lawyer maintains her position as a process facilitator while also drawing
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on her social capital (to bring the lawyer in). Further, she also increases her social capital by adding the seller/buyer
(or both) to her network of weak ties.
Such a socially rich perspective suggests that the real estate agent’s knowledge of the transaction process
and the network of value added players developed and maintained by the real estate agent serve to distinguish the
real estate industry. Agents not only pass information back and forth as in a typical market, but also add value to the
transaction process given their knowledge of the transaction process and the social capital that they possess.
Further, their use of these networks forms the ‘market’ in which the transaction occurs (Swedberg, 1994).
Essentially, the residential real estate agent aggregates the services of the value-added players and
coordinates the real estate transaction. Creating and maintaining this network of value added players, past
customers, and potential future customers constitutes the main work of the real estate agent. Consumers choosing to
conduct the real estate transaction on their own or to retain an agent for limited parts of the process may not have
access to the larger network of value-added players that a real estate agent provides. Nor do most consumers have
the transaction knowledge of the real estate agent. The real estate agent as a trusted intermediary is in a unique
position to guide buyers and sellers through the numerous angles and steps in this complex, emotionally-laden,
process. This, it seems, fulfills an important “hand-holding” function welcome to buyers and sellers during the often
compressed, potentially frenetic time frame in which real estate closings occur.
The transaction-cost perspective helps us recognize that residential real estate closings have high
transaction costs for at least three reasons. First, residential real estate is high in asset specificity in that the real
estate is specific to a given transaction. Second, residential real estate requires that extensive information be
supplied about the land and house. Third, residential real estate is high in uncertainty given the complexity and
inevitability of contract modifications required in the transaction process. The transactions are also low in frequency
given that generally buyers purchase few homes, which means that buyers and sellers are not very skilled in
conducting the transactions.
These considerations suggest that a focus on transaction costs may be most appropriate in cases where the
specific conditions outlined by transaction-cost economics for markets are met, namely in spot markets for
commodity goods. Under these conditions, the goods being traded are fungible, buyers and sellers agree on their
evaluation of the goods, and it is relatively easy for a buyer to know what they are getting. As a result, a single
transaction can in fact be disassociated from others without loss. However, our work suggests that as goods become
unique and/or as evaluations become idiosyncratic or require expertise to make, it becomes harder for a buyer to
know what they are getting. As a result, any individual transaction must be supported by many other transactions.
This interdependency makes it even more apparent that any one transaction is connected to a network of other
transactions.
Drawing on this perspective, in Figure 6 we outline a suggested gradation of asset specificity ranging from
water and energy to custom-designed homes. We expect a transaction focus to be most appropriate at the low end of
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this scale and least appropriate at the high end. We note that the participants in any market are embedded in a social
context (Burt, 2000; Swedberg, 1994). However, some transactions require less information from the context than
do others. For instance, an on-line purchase of a CD occurs within the context of a person whose musical
preferences are often know by others (friends, co-workers) and who learns of new CDs and new sources to buy CDs
from the social network which she creates. At the time of the purchase, however, she may need little transaction
support.
Insert Figure 6 about here
Is there any clear connection between transaction-cost and social-capital perspectives of ICT use? We think
so, and point to Gittell's concepts of relational coordination (Gittell, 2000a, 2000b). This work builds on both
coordination theory and organizational level conceptualizations of social capital. Relational coordination refers to
the efforts of participants that show both an awareness of their relationship to the overall work process and to other
participants in that process. Relational coordination encompasses both communication and relationship ties among
participants. Her work has explored relational coordination in the airline (flight departures) and hospital industries.
She finds that higher levels of relational coordination have a significant and positive impact on both quality and
efficiency outcomes. This work has also identified specific coordination mechanisms, control mechanisms, human
resource and industrial relations practices that serve to strengthen or weaken relational coordination. What this
suggests is that a socially rich theory of market structures can be combined with a socially thin view of transactions
to create a more comprehensive and potentially more robust conceptualization of the roles of ICT use in reshaping
information-intensive work practices.

Conclusion
Our comparative approach provides a means to compare the kinds of insights offered by both the
conceptual perspectives and to better delineate the conditions under which they are most useful. Even more
importantly, we have illustrated with this analysis that in order to provide a more rounded and balanced view of ICT
uses and their role in information-intensive work, such dual-perspective approaches are warranted. In this final
section we highlight several of the implications for the practice of real estate. We also highlight implications for
continued research on ICT use and related organizational/ industrial changes.

Implications for practice
Our analysis suggests that disintermediation is less of a threat than re-intermediation. New value-added
players are beginning to take on parts of the role of the agent as aggregators. Some of these new intermediaries are
traditional players taking on larger roles, such as local real estate franchises. Other sources of re-intermediation are
the myriad Web-based service providers. Perhaps the most notable new entrant may be Microsoft. They seek to
leverage their technical competence and use of the Web as a means to become an intermediary (Crowston &
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Wigand, 1999). The services provided by these new intermediaries lead to an unbundling of services, challenging
the current percentage-based flat fee paid to agents at closing.
Agents are also beginning to un-bundle and specialize their services. This is seen in the teaming approach
(where one agents focuses on buyers and the second on listings). As we noted at the outset, similar
developments—re-intermediation and/or disintermediation—are observable in other industries as well. For example,
travel agents also have reacted in part by unbundling their services. Some have started to charge flat service fees for
booking a flight, making a hotel reservation, planning a travel itinerary, and so on. Real estate agents would
similarly have to start charging fees for specific services rendered rather than the current approach of collecting a
single commission for a bundle of services. However, our research indicates that this solution may not ultimately be
to the advantage of the agent. In the real estate industry, unbundling lessens the agent’s role as a coordinator of the
entire transaction process and in turn weakens the strategic positioning and the degree of control possessed by the
real estate agent in the value chain of the transaction.
For real estate agents, the increasing use of ICT provides a means to extend their social networks and
thereby increase the potential for social capital. Further, there are opportunities for real estate agents to exploit ICT
to add more transaction support/value. For instance, there are numerous local services conceivable that only real
estate agents might be able to offer. These include developing locally-oriented sites that are available only to clients
of agents and provide value-added information about local issues such a neighborhood data, school quality,
sale/resale history, and so on. Much of this data is currently, and somewhat generically, provided free from the
National Association of Realtors site (www.realtor.com). The data from our research suggests that the agents may be
better positioned if they restrict access to such data to clients (such as the efforts by the site maintainers to minimize
the ability of people to easily gather large data sets from this site). Moreover, the agents will be continually
challenged to identify those services, possibly entirely new and previously un-offered services that add such value
for their clients.

Implications for research
This research suggests that the changes in information-intensive work that ICT uses enable/demand differ
depending on the conceptual perspective taken. From a transaction-cost perspective, disintermediation in the real
estate industry seems quite clear and may be indicative of changes in other industries. That is, the findings from this
study suggest that there are steps in the value-added process where use of ICT can reduce transaction costs. For
example, the integrated use of voice-mail, pagers and cell phones allows agents to reduce the time delays in
responding to calls during negotiating a closing and to more quickly reach potential buyers when a new listing is
posted. Uses of ICT to reduce transaction costs of search and access are particularly relevant for industries where
the transaction relies less on a series of coordinated steps to complete and/or where there is low asset specificity
(e.g., Choudhury, 1997). Transaction-cost savings are likely to be less relevant, or relevant for only portions of
knowledge-intensive processes where the steps have complex and multi-faceted inter-relationships.
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A social capital view of the same set of changes provides a different view of market transactions. This
perspective suggests that the value in using ICT is in part to enhance the building (and maintaining) of social capital.
For example, Pisanis and Willcocks (1999) describe how social relations and personal networks are so pervasive in
(and important to) the ship brokering industry that ICT-enabled market-making mechanisms have failed. Barrett’s
(1999) analysis of the uses of ICT in the London insurance market suggests that, again, social capital and social
networks were the more dominant aspect of the market, both impeding and supporting the increased presence of online trading. Since the initial ICT-based systems did not reflect or enable existing social networks, they were not
widely used and have not radically changed the practice of insurance. Those (smaller-scale) systems that did reflect
existing social structures were used and have become embedded in the structures that now exist.
Understanding how the three components of social capital (structure, relation and cognition) are affected by
ICT use provides a means to relate the work of agents to their roles as an intermediary during the buy/sell
transaction. ICT use can affect all three components of social capital. For example, agents can use ICT, such as
linking together voice mail, pager and cell phone, to develop and maintain their network of weak and strong ties.
Use of ICT can also alter the relational aspects of social capital. In our work, findings suggest that real estate agents
who use ICT to buffer themselves from clients (not returning calls, not checking/responding to email, not
maintaining a current Web site) will weaken their relations. And ICT use can alter what is expected of an agent. For
example, many prospective sellers expect that an agent will provide a Web presence for their listing, going beyond
traditional advertising media.
A socially thin view of the residential real estate closing treats this effort as a market-based transaction.
Such a perspective provides a limited approximation to the changes wrought by ICT. This view may also
misrepresent the more nuanced aspects of the adaptations being made. A socially rich view on the same phenomena
highlights a different set of uses of ICT. This perspective showcases the ways in which ICT are used to build and
draw on the social relationships that underpin the actual transactions, to help guide the process of closing, and to
invoke expertise as needed. The socially rich perspective highlights the communicative aspects of information while
the socially thin perspective highlights the informational aspects of communication. This latter view treats
information as discrete and portable. The socially rich perspective emphasizes the embedded nature of information
and the importance of having links to these sources and the awareness to use them.
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Figure 1. A centralized market, from Malone and Smith.
B = Buyers, S = Sellers, A = Agents. Lines represent communications links.
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Figure 2. A centralized market in real estate, showing the role of the Multiple Listing Service (MLS).
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Figure 3. A decentralized market, from Malone and Smith.
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Figure 4. A decentralized market facilitated by a listings Web site.
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Figure 5. Real estate transaction embedded in a web of relationships.
Black circles indicate other social contacts. Dashed lines indicate contacts unrelated to the buy/sell
transaction.
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Figure 6. Varying levels of asset specificity create varying needs for description.
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Table 1. Contrasting Transaction-cost and Social-capital perspectives.

Elements of Perspective

Transaction Cost

Social Capital

Transaction

Isolatable from context

Embedded in context

Role of Information

External to participants, transportable

Embedded in social networks

Role of Intermediaries

Replaceable by lower costs media

Central to the social networks

Agent’s role

Based on explicit contracts

Driven by relations and ties among
people

Social structures

Unimportant to transaction

Primary to closing the house

Roles of ICT

Decoupler of transactions, focused on
information processing

Magnifier of social capital, focused on
value of communicating
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Table 2. Summary of Interviews
Interviewee (position/particulars)
Real Estate Agent (Experienced and successful female agent with a large national franchise, technology
savvy. Key informant: three interviews each of about 60 minutes)
Real Estate Agent (Experienced and successful male agent with a large national franchise, not
technology savvy. Interview lasted 50 minutes)
Real Estate Broker/Owner (Female owner and manager of local franchise of large national firm.
Interview lasted 75 minutes)
Real Estate Broker/Manager (Male manager for one of four offices of local franchise of large national
firm. Interview lasted 75 minutes)
Real Estate Agent (Male, not technology savvy, returning to work as agent with large national franchise.
Interview lasted 40 minutes).
Real Estate Broker/Owner (Male, not technology savvy, owner of a small commercial & residential,
solely-owned local company. Interview lasted 65 minutes)
Real Estate Agent (Male, not technology savvy, and just beginning in real estate, working for successful
agent. Interview lasted 45 minutes.)
Real Estate Lawyer (Male, working for a medium-sized, local firm, specializing in real-estate and
personal law. Interview lasted 35 minutes.)
Home Inspector (Male, working for himself. Interview lasted 20 minutes)
Mortgage officer/broker (Female, employed by large national mortgage corporation. Interview lasted 20
minutes and done over the phone.)
Executive Director, Local Association of Realtors (Female, not technology savvy. Key informant. Two
innterviews. The first interview lasted 90 minutes. Second interview lasted 45 minutes).
Executive Director, Local MLS company (Female, not technology savvy. Interview lasted 55 minutes).
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